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Abstract 
Transportation in the urban context assumes great economic significance, as 
the productive efficiency of urban areas will be maintained only if mobility 
requirements in the cities are fully met. However, this productive efficiency is 
now threatened by the increasing number of vehicles causing congestion, and 
thus slower speeds on roads. An effective way to address this problem is to 
encourage greater use of public transport instead of personal vehicles. This 
requires both an increase in the carrying capacity of the public transport sys-
tem and a quantum improvement in the quality of public transport. 
In addition, despite the high volumes of traffic, most urban centers in India do 
not have any rail transit system to cater to intracity movements. Hence, there 
would be substantial dependence on bus services to meet public transport needs 
for the next several years. This is likely to result in a major restructuring of the 
current provisioning of public transport in the urban centers. This article high-
lights various options for restructuring the provision of road-based public trans-
port and synthesizes them into a strategy for reform, given the commercial 
viability of the various activities carried out by public transport operators in 
India. 
Introduction 
Transport plays a significant role in the overall development of a nation's economy, 
particularly in the urban context, where cities are considered vertices of economic 
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growth. However, concerns are being voiced about the sustainability of develop-
ment in the transport sector as this sector accounts for a substantial and growing 
proportion of air pollution in cities. The most effective strategy for ensuring the 
sustainability of the urban transport sector is to check the decline in the share of 
public transport. This article outlines issues and concerns in the public transport 
sector and the need for reforms. It also suggests a reform strategy for the sector. 
Transport Sedor in India 
India has witnessed rapid growth in the number of total vehicles registered in the 
last two decades. As of March 31, 1998, there were 41 million registered vehicles in 
the nation (Table 1 ). 
Table 1. Growth of Vehicles in India 
No.of Two Car.Jeep, & Buses Good Others 
Year Vehicles Wheelers (%) Taxi(%) (%) Vehicles (%) (%) 
1951 306 8.82 51.96 11.11 26.80 1.31 
1961 665 13.23 46.62 8.57 25.26 6.32 
1971 1,865 30.88 36.57 5.04 18.39 9.12 
1981 5,391 48.56 21.52 3.01 10.28 16.64 
1986 10,577 59.04 16.83 2.15 8.16 13.82 
1991 21,374 66.44 13.82 1.55 6.34 11.85 
1996 33,783 68.83 12.44 1.33 6.01 11.39 
1997 37,231 69.01 12.52 1.31 6.07 11.09 
1998 40,939 69.23 12.35 1.31 6.18 10.94 
Source: MoST, 2000. 
Along with the rise in vehicle population, the increased mobility demand is re-
flected in rising usage rates of personal vehicles. The problem has been accentu-
ated by the gradual reduction of public transport in India as reflected in the declin-
ing share of buses in the total vehicle fleet in the country (a decline from more 
than 11% in 1951 to just over 1% in 1998). 
The rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles in India calls for urgent mea-
sures to deal with the resultant congestion and pollution. In particular, encourag-
ing greater use of public transport instead of personal vehicles, thereby slowing the 
trend toward increasing use of personal vehicles, is key. However, unless the quality 
of public transport services improves substantially, the trend of increasing 
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preference for personal vehicles will continue. This calls for a complete change in 
the mindset of the operators. It is extremely important that the provision of public 
transport services be restructured to ensure service delivery that matches con-
sumers' expectations. One way to do this is to organize the private sector to more 
effectively provide useful services. Improving the quality of services from public 
transport would also require restructuring of the State Road Transport Corpora-
tions [or State Road Transport Undertakings (SRTUs)] so that policy, planning, and 
regulatory functions are carried out by an entity other than the one involved in 
direct operations. There would also be a need for a regulatory framework to over-
see all modes of public transport particularly, urban and suburban railways. 
Performance of Public Transport in India 
Public transport in India can be classified into two modes: rail and road. Out of the 
country's total passenger movement, 80 percent is met by road transport while 
the remaining 20 percent is carried by railways. 
Road Transport 
Road transport in India is operated by both the public and private sectors-com-
prising about 28.7 percent and 71.3 percent, respectively, of the total bus system. 
Government participation in road transport commenced in 1950, and since then 
SRTUs have been formed in every state. 
As of March 1999, there were about 67 SRTUs in the country operating a fleet of 
more than 115,000 buses and employing about a quarter of a million people. Out 
of 59 corporations, 14 operate exclusively in the urban areas and the remaining 45 
in mofussil1 areas (including 9 corporations operating in hilly regions) (Table 2). 
Further, of the corporations operating in mofussil areas, about 8 operate only in 
rural areas (including the hilly regions); the remaining corporations operate in both 
rural and urban areas. Of the total number of buses held by corporations, 17,455 
render services in urban areas; the remaining 95,310 vehicles operate in mofussil 
areas (including 2,659 in hilly regions) (ASRTU 2000). 
Table 2. State Road Transport Undertakings in India 
Number 
SRTUs 
Buses 
Source: ASRTU, 2000. 
Rural 
8 
115,424 
Urban 
14 
17,455 
Rural & Urban 
37 
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The organizational form for public sector bus 
transportation varies from state to state, with 
the most common being a corporation con-
stituted under the provisions of the Road 
Transport Corporation Act of 1950. There are 
22 such corporations. In addition, 26 under-
takings have been formed under the Indian 
Companies Act of 1956,while public trans-
port is also operated by 11 municipal coun-
cils under various municipal legislations. Eight 
undertakings function as part of government 
departments (Figure 1 ). 
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Figure 1. Management of 
SRTU's in India 
Source: ASRTU, 2000. 
Public bus transport in India is provided through a multiplicity of mechanisms. 
These include: 
• Own services: Under this mechanism, the SRTU uses its own fleet. 
• Kilometer scheme: Private buses are hired to run services as required by the 
SRTU. 
• Direct permits: Permits from the State Transport Authority (STA) are given 
directly to private operators to operate on specified routes. The buses are 
owned and operated by the private permit holder who also collects the 
fares. Fares and routes are as allowed by the STA under the Motor Vehicles 
Act of 1988. The private entities operate under the conditions of the per-
mit granted to them. These operators have no relationship to the SRTU 
and operate on their own. 
Operational Performance 
The total strength of the urban SRTUs grew from just about 10,000 in 1991 to 
about 13,500 in 1999, an increase of 28 percent. However, while the total vehicle 
fleet strength grew at almost 1 O percent per year in the 1990s (Table 1 ), the urban 
SRTU fleet grew by less than 3 percent per year (Figure 2). Given that the increase 
in the bus fleet during this period has also not been spectacular (Table 1 ), the size 
and spread of public transport has seen a decline in the last five years. 
The operational characteristics, on the other hand, do not show any distinctive 
trend (Figure 3). While the kilometers operated daily by each bus have shown a 
steady increase, the proportion of the total fleet on road has been declining. 
88 
Restructuring Urban Public Transport 
1990 1992 199• 199e 1998 
Figure 2. Growth in fleet strengths of SRTU's in urban India 
Source: ASRTU, 2000. 
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Figure 3. Financial performance (Rupees per kilometer) of SRTU's. 
Source: ASRTU, 2000. 
Financial Performance 
The overall financial performance of urban SRTUs in India appears to be gloomy, 
with the SRTUs headed toward a severe financial crisis in t he very near future. As of 
March 1999 these corporations had incurred an accum ulated loss of about 13 bil-
lion rupees-nearly as large as the aggregate amount of equity of both the union 
government and the state governments and reserves (14.60 billion rupees). Fur-
ther, this debt is larger than the total assets of the SRTUs. 
As earn ings per kilometer have grown more slowly than costs per kilometer, losses 
per kilometer have grown by nearly 7 percent per year (Figure 4). This situation has 
developed because of continuing inefficiency in operations, uneconomical opera-
tions to meet the universal service obligation, and universal subsidization of 
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Figure 4. Operational performance of SRTU's in urban India. 
Source: ASRTU, 2000. 
services. In addition, the motor vehicle taxation regime taxes buses more than per-
sonal vehicles, resulting in higher cost of operation for public transport. 
A result of the continuing losses has been the inability to generate adequate funds 
for capital expenditure and replacement of rolling stock. There exists a vicious circle 
of continuous losses leading to inadequate funds for capital expenditure and poor 
management of the fleet, which in turn leads to poor operational performance, 
causing even higher losses. The mounting losses imply a substantial commitment 
from the government for the provision of public transportation services in urban 
India. The following sections review current operations and identify areas for re-
form. 
Rationale for Restructuring 
Improved transport systems are essential for accelerated economic growth. Trans-
portation in the urban context assumes even greater significance. Large agglom-
erations are seen as the vertices of continued economic growth. The productive 
efficiency of urban agglomerations will be maintained only if mobility requirements 
in the cities are fully met. However, this productive efficiency in urban India is now 
threatened by the increasing number of vehicles, causing congestion and thus slower 
speeds on roads. Transportation infrastructure could be the primary bottleneck 
for the unimpeded growth of the state. Thus, it is important that the existing trans-
portation infrastructure is utilized optimally. This requires meeting mobility needs 
efficiently through a greater modal share of public transport. 
Another major consideration for restructuring public transport is the continued 
drain on the exchequer. With greater emphasis on fiscal discipline, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for governments to continue funding such loss-making 
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ventures. In addition, the role of the state in provisioning services that can be more 
efficiently provided by private operators is being questioned in a variety of fora. 
Augmenting Public Transport 
While it is recognized that the share of public transport in India is considerably 
higher than that in most developed countries, the cause for concern is the declin-
ing share. Among the major reasons for this decline are the inability of public trans-
port operators to keep pace with the increasing demand and the deteriorating 
quality of service arising from continued losses and thus inadequate capital gen-
eration for capacity augmentation. This issue is dealt with in detail in the next sec-
tion. 
Another problem is the relatively little concern for consumer satisfaction. In most 
cities, government-owned agencies operate and manage public transport services. 
Given the virtual monopoly that public sector service providers enjoy, service plan-
ning has been largely dominated by operating convenience rather than by con-
sumer convenience. With fares and tariffs not linked to costs of operation, there is 
little incentive for service providers to improve efficiency. Also, being public sector 
concerns, the emphasis on commercial orientation is limited. As a result, ridership 
changes and costs of operation are not concerns of the management. Thus, a change 
in the incentive regime is necessary to ensure attention to consumer satisfaction. 
This requires regulatory reforms and institutional restructuring in the urban public 
transport sector. It means splitting up monolithic public entities and allowing pub-
lic sector suppliers to offer services in areas where they are better equipped to 
provide them. 
Mounting Losses of SRTUs 
The considerations for restructuring SRTUs also stem from mounting losses and 
poor operational performances, resulting in a continuous drain on scarce budget-
ary resources. A number of SRTU activities can be efficiently provided by the pri-
vate sector. Also, private sector funds could be tapped to generate revenues for 
fleet augmentation and replacement. 
In the postliberalization era, it would be difficult for governments to continue to 
provide financial support to such loss-making ventures, especially with the grow-
ing emphasis on fiscal discipline. Indications of such concerns can also be gauged 
from the Ninth Plan document where the union government's policy regarding 
the funding of SRTUs is outlined. The thrust of the policy is to fund the acquisition 
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of buses for replacement only, and not for fleet expansion. Public bus fleet expan-
sion is to be funded from the private sector. In fact, the Ninth Plan document also 
states that, given the financial constraints facing the SRTUs, 75 percent of the pub-
lic transport services should be made available from the private sector (Planning 
Commission 1999). Thus, it would be difficult for the state government to per-
petually finance public transport losses, let alone make a capital contribution for 
fleet augmentation. 
Activities that can be performed by several operators (i.e., those on which scarce 
public funds need not be spent) should be separated from those best performed 
by a monopolistic service provider. Thus, public funds would be used only for those 
activities in which private funds are either not available or public funding and man-
agement is desired. Such a separation of activities would also open up other op-
portunities for revenue generation (e.g., commercial exploitation of land resources). 
Comparative Advantage of SRTUs 
Some SRTU functions, such as the workshop activities, are not natural monopolies 
based on economies of scale and are currently being provided by a number of 
private sector operators. It may be difficult to justify continued public expenditure 
on such activities, especially if these services can be provided more efficiently by 
the private sector. Charles Lave uses this idea as the foundation for his argument 
that policy making should be separated from operating functions. He sees the role 
of the government authority as arranging or sponsoring public transportation rather 
than supplying the transportation itself (Urban Transit 1975). 
A review of the current market structure in the urban public transport sector also 
reveals that SRTUs do not have a comparative advantage2 in a number of activities 
they are undertaking. This is particularly true for bus operations where private 
operators provide these services in a more cost-effective manner (though given 
the universal service obligations in the sector, private operations would have to be 
appropriately regulated). Similarly, the SRTUs do not have any comparative advan-
tage in operating workshop facilities, which are competitively provided by the pri-
vate sector for all types of vehicles. 
International Experience in Reforming Public Transport 
The situation of existing public transport institutions being grossly inadequate to 
provide required levels of service to effectively deal with the rapidly increasing con-
gestion and pollution is not peculiar to India alone. It has been faced in most major 
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cities around the world. Several of them have undertaken reforms and restruc-
tured their public transport operations to meet the required demand and the ex-
pected quality of service. 
An examination of the reforms carried out around the world reveals two main 
trends in the restructuring of public transport. The first is to unbundle the mono-
lithic and integrated services into more manageable and compact constituent units. 
This has generally resulted in greater involvement of the private sector in provid-
ing services in a competitive environment. The second trend is to segregate policy 
and planning from operational functions. This enables a separation of activities 
that are natural monopolies from activities that are not natural monopolies. Such 
separation makes it possible to bring in competition in activities that are not natu-
ral monopolies. Competition, in turn, enables improvements in efficiency, enhance-
ment of capacity by tapping private financial resources, and induction of more 
professional management. In addition, it becomes possible to channel scarce pub-
lic funds into activities the public sector is best suited to perform and not use 
them in activities that the private sector is better equipped to perform. 
Models of Private Sedor Involvement 
Private sector participation can take different forms in infrastructure sectors. The 
public transport sector, in particular, can either be unbundled and opened in a 
segmented fashion to private sector participation, or the complete sector can be 
opened to such processes. These options are discussed below. 
Sel'llice Contracts. This is a type of short-duration contract in which a private 
operator performs specific tasks such as provision of buses. By using this op-
tion, it is possible to take advantage of private sector expertise in performing 
technical tasks, or even to open such tasks to competition. Under this option, 
the public utility manager coordinates the tasks performed by private opera-
tors and ensures the investment in the sector. It is not possible to bring man-
agement expertise or improve operating efficiency in this option. However, 
unlike other infrastructure sectors, it is possible to bring additional investment 
under this option in the public transport sector as discussed below. 
The most common form of the service contract in the public transport sector 
is the gross cost model for private sector participation in bus operations. This 
requires the government authority to set the routes operated and fares to be 
charged. Fare revenue accrues to the government authority, which then pays 
the private operator an agreed amount, irrespective of the occupancy and 
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ridership. The operator is simply a supplier of a service, bearing the operating 
risks but insulated from revenue and ridership risks. This way each route can 
be operated by multiple private operators and the private operators do not 
have any incentive to recklessly race each other to each bus stop to gain more 
passengers. Furthermore, private operators are not hurt by fares that do not 
correspond to costs. Hence, this approach is suitable in cases where fare rev-
enues are likely to be uncertain (e.g., new routes, low-density corridors, and in 
cases where government wants to subsidize commuters). 
The quality actually achieved needs to be monitored by a public entity with a 
system of penalties to deter underperformance. The government authority 
awards routes via competitive tender to the lowest bidder. Preference is given 
to private operators who have achieved high standards of quality. This pre-
vents private operators from concentrating only on dense routes and provides 
them with the incentive to improve quality. 
The terms of the gross cost approach are somewhat similar to that of the kilo-
meter scheme except that in the kilometer scheme payments are fixed regard-
less of the type of route or the time of day. In the gross cost scheme, the opera-
tor bids for the compensation. Such a bidding process permits an operator to 
factor the type of route and service quality expected into the amount being 
bid for as compensation. 
Management Contract. This short-term option transfers the responsibility 
for the operation and maintenance of the system to a private operator for a 
fixed fee. This fee could be related to various performance parameters. Al-
though the public utility is still responsible for rehabilitation and new invest-
ment, this option could bring technical and management expertise to the sec-
tor and, to some extent, improve operating efficiency. Management contracts 
in the transport sector are particularly relevant in the management of depots 
and workshops of large bus operators. 
Lease Contract. Under this option, a private firm leases assets of the public 
utility typically for 10 to 20 years for a fee and takes on the responsibility for 
operating and maintaining them without any responsibility of financing new 
investment, which will lie with the public utility. This contract could bring tech-
nical expertise, managerial expertise, and operating efficiency to the sector. 
While investment risk lies with the public utility, the commercial risk is shared 
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between the private operator and the public utility. This form of private par-
ticipation is seldom seen in the public transport sector. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to develop lease contracts in the transport sector for some activities (e.g., 
depots and terminals). 
Concession Contract. A concession agreement, or franchise, is a means of 
awarding fixed, long-term monopoly rights to provide a service to a private 
firm within a geographical area. Under this option, the private operator is not 
only responsible for operation and maintenance of existing assets but also for 
new investments, although the ownership lies with the government or the 
public utility. This option could bring technical expertise, managerial exper-
tise, operating efficiency, and additional investment to the sector. Investment 
risks and commercial risks lie with the private operator. 
The application of the concession type of private participation in the public 
transport sector is the net cost scheme in the public transport sector, whereby 
the operator receives the revenue from ticket sales, as opposed to a fixed pay-
ment in the gross cost approach, thus taking the risk of changes in financial 
performance over the contract period. A public entity continues to set routes, 
prescribe fares and service quality, and may either provide a fixed subsidy or 
receive a fixed contract fee (if the route makes profits). The government au-
thority awards each route via competitive bid to the private operator requir-
ing the least amount of subsidy or willing to pay the greatest fee. 
Due to the revenue risk, this option would be suitable for high-density corri-
dors with only a few operators, where ridership would be more certain, so that 
private operators have no motivation to adopt dangerous passenger capture 
techniques (e.g., rash driving and speeding). However, this would imply that a 
private operator would have a near monopoly over an area and would require 
appropriate regulation to ensure that such monopoly power is not misused. 
Divestiture. This option, achieved through the sale of assets or shares or 
through management buyout, can be partial or complete. It gives the private 
operator full responsibility for operation, management, and investment. Un-
like the concession contract, it transfers ownership of assets to the private sec-
tor. This is the model that has been adopted in the rail transport industry in 
the United Kingdom. 
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Lessons for Restruduring Public Transport 
The two relevant options for bus operations highlighted above are the gross cost 
and net cost options. In deciding between the two, a key concern is whether large 
private operators would come into the sector in India. If not, then the net cost 
option will not solve the safety problem. The gross cost option is also favorable 
because under this plan it is easier to integrate fares among different operators and 
different modes (Walters 1998). Finally, if the government perceives the need to 
subsidize commuters, the gross cost option would shield private operators from 
such revenue risks. However, the gross cost option requires more monitoring be-
cause the private operator will have no incentive to attract passengers or accu-
rately collect fares. If the government authority cannot provide the required moni-
toring, then the use of the gross cost option will result in decreased quality, falling 
ridership, and increased costs to the government authority. 
Given the lack of proven capacity of the private sector to operate large public trans-
port fleets in urban India, the gross cost option may be a more feasible option in 
the short run to initiate private participation in public transport. Also, this option 
would allow the government to gradually phase out subsidies so as to minimize 
political and community resistance to restructuring. Over time, operations under 
the kilometer scheme would allow the private sector to develop its capability to 
operate and manage large public bus fleets. 
Unbundling State Bus Operators 
Urban SRTUs provide public transport services in India using both their own fleets 
and by leasing buses from private operators under the kilometer scheme. In addi-
tion to operating these bus services, SRTUs also repair and maintain the vehicles. 
The repairs and maintenance wing provides technical support to the SRTU buses 
only and not to private bus operators despite having excess staff in this category, as 
is the case with Delhi Transport Corporation (OTC) (OTC 2001 ). Thus, there exists 
a resource of technically competent personnel, which can be used to service addi-
tional vehicles. The SRTUs also own land for parking buses (at depots) and passen-
ger terminals for providing traffic interchanges.3 
96 
Restructuring Urban Public Transport 
These activities are representative of most urban SRTUs in India. It is possible to 
classify the activities of urban SRTUs as: 
• operating buses; 
• providing parking facilities for buses, terminal facilities for passenger inter-
changes, and bus stations; and 
• carrying out repairs and maintenance. 
These three activities, though independent of each other in the sense of requiring 
an independent operational structure and separate staff, do not function as sepa-
rate profit centers. No separate accounts are maintained to evaluate which of these 
is a profitable activity. Ideally, these three activities should be operated as discrete 
profit centers. 
City Bus Operations 
Operating city services is clearly not a natural monopoly because several private 
operators are already operating services on city roads. An international review re-
veals that with appropriate regulation, private operations of public bus services 
would be successful. In light of the precarious financial position of the Indian gov-
ernment and the continuing losses suffered by the SRTUs as well as the feasibility 
of bus services being provided in a competitive market, greater involvement of the 
private sector in operating services in urban areas is recommended. The govern-
ment should largely concern itself with policy making, planning, coordination, and 
regulation, rather than with actual operation of services. 
India's experience with private operation of public transport has not always been a 
success. Assessments of privately operated buses in Delhi reveal poor quality of 
service delivered and low level of commuter satisfaction {Goel 2000). However, 
through private sector participation, such as in the kilometer scheme in both Delhi 
and Bangalore, the SRTU has increased its market share without any additional 
capital expenditure (DTC 2001 ). In using hired buses, the SRTU would save on 
capital investments, thus reducing the strain on the exchequer. However, it will be 
saddled with problems associated with the current form of the kilometer scheme, 
namely, the unwillingness of operators to operate on crowded routes and during 
peak hours or their motivation to make compromises on ridership. On the other 
hand, in allowing only private operators under concession contracts, the public 
transport system would remain uncoordinated and also run the risk of dangerous 
driving practices being adopted by operators. 
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It is recommended that SRTUs not augment their urban bus fleet. The additional 
ridership demand should be met by obtaining services from private operators on 
gross cost contracts. Over time the SRTUs should phase out their own bus services 
by not replenishing the fleet and substituting their services with contracted ser-
vices. To avoid the pitfalls associated with the kilometer scheme, the compensa-
tion payable should vary from route to route and also by time of day. An effective 
monitoring system needs to be in place to ensure that there is adherence to the 
contractual terms. 
Over time the private sector operations would mature and the government could 
withdraw from operation of public buses completely and only regulate the sector. 
Such a gradual process would also allow the SRTUs to recover their investments in 
the public transport sector completely. Also, public bus operations for an initial 
period in competition with the private sector would enable a regulatory agency to 
set benchmarks for quality and also allow time for experience to be gained with 
net cost contracts before public operation is completely stopped. A gradual pro-
cess would also help build support for such reforms. Finally, a gradual rationaliza-
tion of the tariff regime would ensure financial viability of the sector and it would 
be feasible to transfer the revenue risk to the private sector. 
Apart from restructuring the SRTU operations, another area of concern in the public 
transport sector is the operation of individual services. Clearly, such operations 
would not fit into the new scheme. However, it would be legally difficult to termi-
nate these services, as they are operating under valid permits. Nevertheless, re-
course could be taken to the provisions of section 103 (2) of the Motor Vehicles 
Act of 1988, which permits the state government to cancel an existing permit or 
modify the terms of an existing permit. However, there may be a disruption in 
public transport services if these operators do not join the kilometer scheme im-
mediately. Another alternative would be for the operators to form large coopera-
tives, which would be given operating contracts. These permits could be allowed 
to lapse and not be renewed. This alternative would permit a gradual withdrawal 
of private individual bus services. Hence, it is recommended that existing permits 
be canceled and brought under the ambit of gross cost contracts. 
Depot and Terminals 
Ownership and management of depots, terminals, and bus stations are a natural 
monopoly, and it would be inefficient for a multiplicity of operators to own and 
manage these infrastructure facilities. These properties should be provided as com-
mon facilities for all operators. Nevertheless, the activities can be still operated as a 
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separate profit centers in the form of a separate corporation. Due to the monopoly 
nature of the activities, it is recommended that the state government retain a con-
trolling stake in the corporation, thus effecting partial divestiture. Another alterna-
tive would be to allow professional management of these properties by the private 
sector using lease contracts. In either case, unbundling these activities from bus 
operations by setting up a separate corporation would facilitate the lease con-
tracts. 
The corporation should enter into contracts with the intercity bus corporations 
and the SRTU or any private operators to allow parking within its premises for an 
appropriate fee. Also, the company could earn substantial revenues through prop-
erty development and advertising. It could lease space for suitable retail outlets for 
additional revenues. This would have the twin benefits of revenue generation as 
well as improving access to public transport. As the SRTU lacks professional exper-
tise to develop or manage commercial property, it is suggested that separate Spe-
cial Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) be considered for each property as a joint venture 
with a strategic partner such as a reputed property developer company so that the 
requisite property development and management skills are available. 
It is important to recognize that commercial development of the properties allo-
cated to this company could be more remunerative than provision of parking fa-
cilities for buses or interchanges for passengers. Thus, if the company is to operate 
on commercial considerations only, there might be a conflict in the provisioning of 
such services and operating only on profit considerations. While it is recommend 
that the company operate only on commercial considerations, for commercial de-
velopment of its properties it would need approval from appropriate regulatory 
agencies. 
Repairs and Maintenance Workshops 
Management of the workshops and repair facilities is not a natural monopoly. There 
are several private workshops at which repairs could be carried out and there is no 
need for public funds to be spent on these facilities. However, given the fact that 
substantial infrastructure for repairs already exists with SRTUs, they may be used 
for repairs and maintenance of all buses and other motor vehicles. The second 
advantage is that SRTUs also have technically competent personnel who can ser-
vice the city vehicle fleet. However, repairs should be done on a purely commercial 
basis by charging market-based fees. If this activity can not be sustained in the 
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public sector, then it should be privatized. A separate company should be used to 
facilitate this operation. 
Other Issues to be Resolved 
Restructuring SRTUs would help improve their financial performance and con-
serve public funds. Using the private sector to provide bus services would result in 
improved performance and additional capacity. Yet, the restructuring of SRTUs 
alone would not be sufficient for bringing about a marked improvement in the 
quality of public transport. To bring about the required improvements and attract 
private investments in public transport, it is necessary that several planning, li-
censing, and monitoring functions be performed effectively. These functions in-
clude: 
• fixation of fares and fees; 
• route and network design; 
• route allocation and issue of permits; 
• specification, monitoring, and enforcement of quality of service standards; 
• coordination; 
• data collection and management; 
• dispute resolution; and 
• making recommendations to government on policy matters. 
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Endnotes 
1. The area outside the city is called "mofussil." 
2. This means a firm is more competitive in the delivery of that service. 
3. Interestingly, while the privately operated public buses (Blueline buses) in Delhi 
are permitted to use the terminal facilities for picking up passengers, for which 
they pay a charge of Rs 2,500 per month for using the bus stands and Rs 5,000 
per month for using terminals, there is no provision to let them use the depot 
facilities for parking. OTC collected nearly 20 million rupees in 2000-01 for 
such charges. 
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